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[1]李梦瑶王俏荔.多任务委托代理视角下家庭医生签约服务高质量发展激励研究[J].中国卫生质量管理,2026,33(7):97-102.[doi:10.13912/j.cnki.chqm.2026.33.7.19]
　LI Mengyao,WANG Qiaoli.Incentive Research on High-Quality Development of Family Doctor Contract Services from a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Perspective[J].Chinese Health Quality Management,2026,33(7):97-102.[doi:10.13912/j.cnki.chqm.2026.33.7.19]

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多任务委托代理视角下家庭医生签约服务高质量发展激励研究

《中国卫生质量管理》[ISSN:1006-7515/CN:CN 61-1283/R] 卷: 33 期数: 2026年7期页码: 97-102 栏目: 基层卫生质量出版日期: 2026-07-15

Title:: Incentive Research on High-Quality Development of Family Doctor Contract Services from a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Perspective

作者:: 李梦瑶王俏荔; 宁夏医科大学人文与管理学院

Author(s):: LI Mengyao; WANG Qiaoli; School of Humanities and Management, Ningxia Medical University

关键词:: 家庭医生签约服务; 多任务激励; 委托代理理论; 服务质量; 最优契约

Keywords:: Family Doctor Contract Service; Multi-Task Incentive; Principal-Agent Theory; Service Quality; Optimal Contract

分类号:: R197

DOI:: 10.13912/j.cnki.chqm.2026.33.7.19

文献标志码:: A

摘要:: 目的在基本医疗与健康管理任务并存的背景下，探索构建家庭医生签约服务激励机制，提升家庭医生努力水平，推动签约服务高质量发展。方法基于多任务委托-代理理论，将基本医疗服务与健康管理服务并置，引入任务相关性，并以外生不确定性刻画两类任务的量化考核难度差异，构建可求解的最优契约模型；同时,运用MATLAB软件进行数值仿真验证。结果政府最优激励强度与家庭医生努力成本、风险规避程度、任务相关性及外生不确定性呈负相关；任务互补性可促进努力程度均衡配置，而任务替代性易引发“挤出效应”；两项任务外生不确定性差异越大，最优激励强度差异越大，且任务相关性会强化该现象。结论政府应针对不同任务的考核难度设计差异化、可动态调整的激励机制，强化多任务协同，并完善对家庭医生的监督与支持机制。

Abstract:: ObjectiveTo explore the construction of an incentive mechanism for family doctor contract services under the coexistence of basic medical care and health management tasks, aiming to enhance the effort level of family doctors and promote high-quality development of contract services.MethodsBased on multi-task principal-agent theory, basic medical services and health management services were placed side by side. Task correlation was introduced, and exogenous uncertainty was used to characterize the differences in quantitative assessment difficulty between the two types of tasks. A solvable optimal contract model was constructed, and numerical simulation was performed using MATLAB for verification.ResultsThe government’s optimal incentive intensity was negatively correlated with family doctors’ effort cost, risk aversion, task correlation, and exogenous uncertainty. Task complementarity facilitated balanced effort allocation, whereas task substitutability was prone to trigger a "crowding-out effect".The greater the difference in exogenous uncertainty between the two tasks, the greater the difference in optimal incentive intensity, and task correlation would reinforce this phenomenon.Conclusion The government should design differentiated and dynamically adjustable incentive mechanisms based on the assessment difficulty of different tasks, strengthen multi-task synergy, and improve the supervision and support mechanisms for family doctors.

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更新日期/Last Update: 2026-07-15